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Joint Development and Multiple Uses:
Integrated Transportation Corridors
Because transportation investments appear to have the strongest influ-
ence on the form of subsequent urban development, joint projects involv-
ing transport rights-of-way offer the largest opportunities for advancing
comprehensive planning objectives. This is particularly true in the de-
velopment of routes to serve growing areas, and in the portions of systems
traversing areas subject to urban renewal. Because of the large right-of-way
widths involved, urban freeways have consumed large land acreages and have
become disrupting barriers between established neighborhoods. In addition,
valuable land is removed from municipal tax rolls, and the relocation prob-
lems, for displaced households and businesses are often substantial.
The joint project concept, nonetheless, represents a key technique for
achieving integrated transportation and land-use planning. Major transpor-
tation rights-of-way are of course linear and usually involve a sidestrip or
buffer of flexible width. The interchange areas of urban freeways frequently
include open, undeveloped areas within ramp arrangements as well. These
ramp interiors often reach two or more acres in size, particularly in associa-
tion with cloverleaf and directional interchanges. Joint projects may front
upon and include these kinds of transportation land and may also be devel-
oped utilizing the airspace over freeways or the land under elevated free-
ways. They may range from single buildings to large developments involving
several buildings. In short, joint projects may be developed adjacent to,
over, under, or upon transportation land and may involve sites and facilities
which vary considerably in size, shape, and scope.
An important objective for joint project development is to maintain neigh-
borhood continuity in built-up areas affected by new highway developments.
The elimination of the "Chinese wall" aspect of urban freeways is the main
concern here. The relocation of displaced businesses and families is also in-
volved and could be accomplished through joint project planning which pro-
vides replacement facilities in the vicinity. A time-phased schedule of joint
project development and freeway construction could, for example, lead to
orderly neighborhood assimilation of these major transportation routes. The
maintenance of neighborhood continuity can very often keep tax-paying land
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uses within the area as well.
A second and related objective for joint project planning involves the
economic and aesthetic benefits of coordinated design. Locations near major
transportation routes, because of their high exposure to passing travelers,
often offer excellent opportunities for aesthetic improvement. In addition to
these architectural design possibilities, joint projects can promote the efficient
planning and design of related urban facilities which are coordinated within
a single project. Better functional relationships can result, with less total
land required and frequently at a savings in land acquisition costs.
Recreation joint projects may be either regional or local in nature and
special types of development within each category are distinguished. For
instance, regional parks may be linear in form or may involve cultural-rec-
reational facilities requiring high accessibility, while local parks might in-
volve ornamental landscaping along the right-of-way or the development of
a local playground beneath an elevated structure. Public building oppor-
tunities appear to fall into four general classifications: medical facilities,
educational buildings, governmental facilities, and cultural and public as-
sembly facilities. Joint projects of utilities might involve the distribution
systems or other fixed facilities of various public and quasi-public utilities.
Potential joint projects involving transit in coordination with freeway rights-
of-way include exclusive transit lanes, bus turnout slots, and commuter park-
ing lots, while parking joint projects might involve under-structure parking
facilities, parking decks constructed over a freeway or transit right-of-way,
or multiple-purpose transportation centers. Housing joint projects could be
developed over or adjacent to a major transportation facility and might be
either publicly or privately built. A variety of private developments in addi-
tion to housing projects appear to be feasible for joint project treatment in-
cluding office buildings, hotels, convention centers, shopping centers, indus-
trial parks, and distribution centers.
Legal Aspects
An analysis of joint development law and institutions involves three basic
questions: (1) Does the joint project comply with the requirements of
state and federal constitutions? (2) What statutory authority is available un-
der which the land for the project may be acquired and public money
spent? (3) What legal problems may arise after the land is acquired?
Each specific development situation requires its own analysis. Consequently,
the ensuing discussion of these legal questions provides a frame of reference
rather than any "formula" for solution of specific projects.
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Constitutional Basis and Limitations
Government participation in joint public improvement projects must con-
form to constitutional and statutory grants of power and restrictions. This
article first considers constitutional limitations on government projects and
then examines the range of statutory powers which are available to carry out
joint development projects.
Public Use
In a joint development project government power may be applied to attain
a wide range of goals at times including both public and private matters.
Government powers to spend public funds, levy taxes, and condemn prop-
erty-including the powers of federal, state, county, and municipal govern-
ments-must comply with the fifth and fourteenth amendments to the Con-
stitution of the United States.'
Neither a tax on a citizen nor an appropriation of his property by the
government is lawful under these constitutional standards unless the pur-
poses are for "public uses."'2 The meaning of the term "public use" as used
in the Constitution has been developed by many individual decisions of both
state and federal courts so that the term has developed a legal meaning
which may be quite different from ordinary usage.3  In this century the
meaning of public use has broadened considerably to permit a wide range
of activity beyond the functions of government which were customary in the
19th century such as public roads, drainage ditches, public schools, govern-
ment buildings, and parks. Gradually a few privately-owned public uses
were established through legislative delegations of power to private con-
cerns which render public services such as water, sewer, gas and electric
1. "No person shall be ... deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compen-
sation." U.S. CONST. amend. V. "[N]or shall any State deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." Id. amend. XIV. Similar language
is also found in most state constitutions. See, e.g., IND. CONST. art. 1, § 21; LA.
CONST. art. 1, § 2; TEX. CONST. art. 1, § 17.
2. Jones v. Portland, 245 U.S. 217 (1917) (taxation); Head v. Amoskeag Mfg.
Co., 113 U.S. 9 (1885) (condemnation). In some respects (particularly in regard to pro-
cedure) the power of government to levy taxes is broader than the power to condemn
property. However, for the purposes of this report the "public use" test can be con-
sidered as substantially a single rule applicable to both government powers.
3. The concept of "public use" as a legal test may be traced to biblical times.
Although land was held "tenurially" (e.g., by grace of the sovereign, subject to escheat
to the sovereign in case of treason or death of the owner leaving no heirs) the owner's
estate apparently could not be taken from him during his tenure for other than public
purposes. 1 KINGS 21.
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utilities, and railroads and other common carriers. 4  Moreover, certain
valid public uses have been established in which the use of the property
condemned is never even made available to the public such as private rights-
of-way, sewers, and drainpipes.,
More recently, developments in the concept of public use have reflected
the expanding role of government in all areas affecting the public health,
safety, morals, and general welfare. As early as 1923 the Supreme Court
indicated the current liberality of interpretation given to the term declaring
that "[p]ublic uses are not limited, in the modem view, to matters of mere
business necessity . . .but may extend to matters of public health, recrea-
tion and enjoyment." 6
Under this modern public use test the Court will uphold any government
undertaking "which is reasonable in relation to its subject and is adopted in
the interests of the community" to alleviate any community problem of ex-
tensive or significant impact. 7
Nevertheless, these Supreme Court decisions do not mean that the public
use test can be ignored. The state courts have often interpreted the lan-
guage of their own constitutions more strictly than the Supreme Court has
and a joint project may receive its most severe test in state courts. How-
ever, an increasing number of state courts have followed the federal courts
in becoming more permissive of broad government action. This historical
trend may be traced by examining the judicial rules commonly applied to
four types of projects which involve a public use.
Projects Owned and Used by the Public
The projects in which the taxation and condemnation powers of government
were first established as proper are public works owned by and open to the
4. These projects include private businesses "affected with a public interest" un-
der the doctrine of Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1877), e.g., common carriers, utilities,
warehousemen, and grain elevators. These activities substantially affect the welfare of
a broad sector of the public, are not in highly competitive fields and consequently are
usually subject to some government regulation. These cases, in addition to establish-
ing the right to condemn property for the particular public uses cited, also support
the right of government to delegate the power to condemn property to private in-
dividuals under suitable safeguards.
5. See Strickley v. Highland Boy Gold Mining Co., 200 U.S. 527 (1906).
6. Rindge Co. v. Los Angeles, 262 U.S. 700, 707 (1923). See also West Coast
Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 391 (1937). There are cases where it would
obviously be for the public benefit if properties owned by certain individuals were in
the hands of others so that dilapidated buildings could be replaced by better ones and
unsightly places beautified to gratify the public taste. However, such circumstances
alone would not warrant expropriation because of due process restrictions. 1 T. COOLEY,
TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 1131 (8th ed. 1927).
7. West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 391 (1937).
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public. Highways, mass transit facilities, hospitals, and public schools are
examples of this group. The public use of these projects is clear even when
measured against the narrowest definition of the powers of government. 8
Public Benefit Without Public Ownership
Some early cases intimate that private ownership and occupancy of a project
is inconsistent with the concept of public use. 9 But the courts soon estab-
lished that some projects provide a public benefit even though they are
neither owned nor occupied by the public in the same sense as parks and
highways. Such projects as electric power lines, gas mains, railroad rights-
of-way, cemeteries, private schools and colleges, highway service areas, and
auto parking lots have all been held to be public uses. 10 These projects,
often run by private enterprise for profit, may lawfully be granted both the
power of condemnation and various tax benefits by statute. 1 The modern
8. See, e.g., Cole v. LaGrange, 113 U.S. 1 (1885); Opinion of the Justices, 204
Mass. 607, 91 N.E. 405 (1910). Compare Curran v. Guilfoyle, 38 App. Div. 82, 55
N.Y.S. 1018 (1899), with Pennsylvania Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Philadelphia, 242 Pa.
47, 88 A. 904 (1913).
9. See Cole v. LaGrange, 113 U.S. 1 (1885); Opinion of the Justices, 204 Mass.
607, 91 N.E. 405 (1910); Pennsylvania Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Philadelphia, 242 Pa.
47, 88 A. 904 (1913).
10. See, e.g., Green v. Frazier, 253 U.S. 233 (1920) (banks, grain elevators); Jones
v. Portland, 245 U.S. 217 (1917) (municipal fuel yard); United States v. Land in
Sewickley Township, 54 F. Supp. 943 (W.D. Pa. 1944) (retail stores in housing
project); University of Southern California v. Robbins, 1 Cal. App. 2d 523, 37 P.2d
163 (1934) (college); Poole v. Kankakee, 406 Ill. 521, 94 N.E.2d 416 (1950) (parking
garage); Moore v. Sanford, 151 Mass. 285, 24 N.E. 323 (1890) (harbor and wharves);
Bush Terminal Co. v. New York, 282 N.Y. 306, 26 N.E.2d 269, 16 N.Y.S.2d 9
(1940) (railroad terminal); Appeal of Rees, 8 Sadler (Pa.) 182, 12 A. 427 (1888)
(public exposition hall, education). But see Limits Indus. R.R. v. American Spiral
Pipe Works, 321 Ill. 101, 151 N.E. 567 (1926) (particular rail terminal held not of
value to sufficiently broad sector of public; condemnation reversed); Fountain Park
Co. v. Hensler, 199 Ind. 95, 155 N.E. 465 (1927) (ethical society meeting ground;
condemnation reversed for lack of public use).
11. One early example is state mill dam development legislation under which in-
dividuals were authorized to dam a river, construct a mill and condemn necessary land
and riparian rights. In a few instances this was permitted for mills which did not
serve the public. Condemnation was upheld in Head v. Amoskeag Mfg. Co., 113
U.S. 9 (1885). See also cases cited in Fountain Park Co. v. Hensler, 199 Ind. 95,
155 N.E. 465 (1927). A few other examples are: laws permitting a property owner to
condemn a private right-of-way across neighboring land if his property totally lacked
access ways; laws in desert states permitting condemnation for private irrigation pipe-
lines; laws empowering condemnation for private drainage and sewer systems; a law
in a mining industry state permitting mine owners to condemn rights-of-way across
private property for mine conveyors. Strickley v. Highland Boy Gold Mining Co.,
200 U.S. 527 (1906); Linggi v. Garovotti, 45 Cal. 2d 20, 286 P.2d 15 (1955). But see
Limits Indus. R.R. v. American Spiral Pipe Works, 321 Ill. 101, 151 N.E. 567 (1926)
preventing a railroad condemnation found to be for private use. The courts treat such
laws, either empowering private persons to condemn property or empowering public
agencies to give or sell property to private persons, with great caution.
1970]
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rule is that the question of public or private ownership is only a procedural,
incidental matter. Whether the project meets the public use test depends
upon whether the substantive goals of the project are reasonably related to
public health, safety, or welfare. 12
Some state courts find that the public use test is satisfied only if formal
commitments are secured assuring that such projects will be held open to the
public, that charges will be reasonable, service nondiscriminatory, or that
property condemned cannot be resold or otherwise diverted from public use
for a stated period.' 3 However, other courts will sometimes go to sur-
prising lengths to uphold a project against an attack based on lack of protec-
tive conditions. 14
The Elimination of Evils
Publicly aided projects involving neither public occupancy nor direct public
benefits also have been upheld in court if the ultimate goal was the elimina-
tion of an evil reasonably requiring the use of condemnation powers or other
special relief. Under this rationale the courts upheld the use of the emi-
nent domain power to control the height of buildings15 and to eliminate non-
conforming uses of residence districts.' 6
The more recent use of eminent domain to eliminate evils is exemplified
by federal and state legislation authorizing public housing, slum clearance,
and redevelopment which has been upheld repeatedly on the grounds that
slum and blight conditions are injurious to public health, safety, morals, and
welfare. 17  Similarly, the condemnation of holding company securities was
upheld as a means of eliminating undue concentrations of power.' 8
12. See, e.g., Puerto Rico v. Eastern Sugar Associates, 156 F.2d 316 (lst Cir. 1946);
Zurn v. Chicago, 389 Ill. 114, 59 N.E.2d 18 (1945); Annbar Associates v. West Side
Redev. Corp., 397 S.W.2d 635 (Mo. Ct. App. 1965).
13. See, e.g., Poole v. Kankakee, 406 Ill. 521, 94 N.E.2d 416 (1950); Albritton v.
Winona, 181 Miss. 75, 178 So. 799 (1938); David Jeffrey Co. v. Milwaukee, 267
Wisc. 559, 66 N.W.2d 362 (1954).
14. For example, under an Indiana law property was condemned to be turned over
to private interests for purposes of building and operating a parking facility; but no
ongoing regulation was provided. Stretching to uphold the project, a court ruled that
a parking garage was a form of warehouse and hence subject to common law re-
straints on service and rates. Under the court's reasoning from the common law,
direct regulation was therefore not necessary to protect the public use aspects of the
facility. Foltz v. Indianapolis, 234 Ind. 656, 130 N.E.2d 650 (1955).
15. Attorney General v. Williams, 174 Mass. 476, 55 N.E. 77 (1899).
16. State ex rel. Twin City Bldg. & Inv. Co. v. Houghton, 144 Minn. 1, 176 N.W.
159 (1920).
17. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954). See also Zurn v. Chicago, 389 Ill. 114,
59 N.E.2d 18 (1945); Allydonn Realty Corp. v. Holyoke Housing Authority, 304
Mass. 288, 23 N.E.2d 665 (1939).
18. 15 U.S.C. § 79k (1964). See American Power & Light Co. v. SEC, 329
U.S. 90 (1946).
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Promotion of the General Welfare
A fourth category of public uses is based on a broad interpretation of the
powers of government in regard to the promotion of the general welfare.
As previously indicated, the Supreme Court has held that the Constitution
does not preclude the government from undertaking any commercial, in-
dustrial, or agricultural enterprise in competition with private industry where
a legislative determination has been made that the public welfare requires
such a program, as long as the legislative judgment is not demonstrably in
error.19 State courts have approved many projects under the general wel-
fare powers including preventive land acquisition to forestall anticipated
slum or blight conditions, 20 land reform legislation to condemn large farms
and sell the property to tenant farmers, 21 and the creation of state-owned
industrial factories to remedy unemployment or for general economic wel-
fare.22 As the Mississippi Supreme Court has stated:
The due process of law provisions of our constitutions do not
enact Adam Smith's concept of the negative state, one of the main
functions of which would be to stand aloof from intervention in
the social and economic life of its citizens.
23
Because of the successful acceptance of these projects in the courts, little
general limitation can be placed on the power of a state to undertake projects
to further the public welfare other than the "not demonstrably erroneous"
test set forth above. Nevertheless, some state courts continue to enforce a
restrictive view of the due process concept which would not permit all of
these programs. Although clarity and breadth in drafting enabling legisla-
tion will reduce the problem posed by such legal precedent, a few jurisdictions
19. Green v. Frazier, 253 U.S. 233 (1920) (uphold the law if it is "not clearly un-
founded"). See also Puerto Rico v. Eastern Sugar Associates, 156 F.2d 316 (1st
Cir. 1946) (uphold a program "until . . . shown . . . an impossibility"); Department
of Pub. Works v. Farina, 29 Ill. 2d 474, 194 N.E.2d 209 (1963) (uphold unless powers
"have been manifestly abused").
20. See, e.g., Redevelopment Agency v. Hayes, 122 Cal. App. 777, 266 P.2d 105
(1954); Gutknecht v. Chicago, 3 Ill. 2d 539, 121 N.E.2d 791 (1954); David Jeffrey Co.
v. Milwaukee, 267 Wisc. 559, 66 N.W.2d 362 (1954).
21. Puerto Rico v. Eastern Sugar Associates, 156 F.2d 316 (1st Cir. 1946).
22. Albritton v. Winona, 181 Miss. 75, 178 So. 799 (1938). An increasing number
of states (some proceeding under state constitutional amendments broadening existing
concepts of due process) have undertaken a variety of programs regarding housing,
building, and financing industries, developing and redeveloping commercial and business
districts, and other activities to further the general public welfare, both economic and
social. See, e.g., Maryland Indus. Dev. Financing Authority v. Meadow-Croft, 243 Md.
515, 221 A.2d 632 (1966) (all industry); Frostburg v. Jenkins, 215 Md. 9, 136 A.2d
852 (1957) (garment factory); Sublett v. Tulsa, 405 P.2d 185 (Okla. Sup. Ct. 1965)
(port industry); Schenck v. Pittsburgh, 364 Pa. 31, 70 A.2d 612 (1950) (downtown
commercial project); Atwood v. Willacy County Navigation Dist., 153 Tex. 645, 271
S.W.2d 137, appeal dismissed, 350 U.S. 804 (1954) (industrial park).
23. Albritton v. Winona, 181 Miss. 75, 81, 178 So. 799, 805 (1938).
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may require state constitutional amendments to carry out public projects
which transcend traditional areas of public activity.
The Future of the Public Use Test
Although the public use test with which public projects must comply has ex-
panded greatly, it remains a significant limitation. In general, a "joint
project" meets the ,constitutional test only if each part of the project is a con-
stitutional public use. Thus if a school and a highway are public uses, it
follows that the joint construction of the school and the highway is a public
use.
Future courts, however, might respond to the functional benefits of joint
development by liberalizing even further the constitutional test for such
projects. They might hold that because the joint planning and large-scale
development involved in joint projects contributes an added value to society
over and above the value of the sum of the individual components of the
joint project, 24 a joint development project may be a public use even if some
of its individual components would not be so considered. The Supreme
Court has upheld the principle inherent in urban renewal that the preven-
tion of future slums requires that an entire area be planned as a whole:
The entire area needed redesigning so that a balanced, inte-
grated plan could be developed for the region, including not only
new homes but also schools, churches, parks, streets, and shopping
centers. In this way it was hoped that the cycle of decay of the
area could be controlled and the birth of future slums pre-
vented. 25
It requires only a moderate extension of this argument to hold that any
joint development designed to prevent future slums is a public use even
though it involves the taking of land which is not now blighted or deteriorated.
An alternative argument which future courts might use to expand the con-
stitutional limits of public use could be based on the desirability of govern-
ment acquisition of vacant land for future use. Because it is impossible to
plan accurately for all future public needs, it is argued that the municipality
24. This added value is the reason, for example, why more liberalized zoning has
been permitted for "planned developments" and why the federal government contributes
large sums annually for comprehensive planning.
25. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 34, 35 (1954). Analogies may also be found in
the arguments which have been used to justify the acquisition of vacant land with
tangled titles, Gutknecht v. Chicago, 414 Ill. 600, 111 N.E.2d 626 (1953); cf. Berman v.
Parker, supra, to justify the statutory modification of real property rights under long
term leaseholds which impair the marketability of land. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 21,
§§ 103, 104, interpreted in, Stewart v. Gorter, 70 Md. 242, 16 A. 644 (1889), and
to justify the condemnation of private riparian rights hampering the construction
of a dam, Head v. Amoskeag Mfg. Co., 113 U.S. 9 (1885).
[Vol. 20:93
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should maintain a "land bank" of vacant land available to meet unexpected
future needs in the manner adopted by cities in Sweden and some other
continental countries. 26  Under past precedents, however, public ownership
of property has not in itself been found sufficient to meet the requirements
of the public use test. Public ownership is permissible only as an adjunct
to a clearly valid public use such as protective land clearance around the
apron of a reservoir to prevent pollution or acquisition of land to be held for
reasonably foreseen future development when an existing public project is
expanded. 27  Some courts have said that the government may not lawfully
speculate in land. 28 Despite these precedents, many state courts have now
sanctioned the issuance of industrial development bonds for the acquisition
of vacant land to attract industry. 29 These cases could lead to the con-
clusion that municipalities might purchase or condemn land for purposes
which are unknown at the time of acquisition because the general welfare
is served by maintaining a substantial reserve of vacant or leased land to
meet future needs which cannot be adequately defined by current planning.
One can only speculate whether the courts of the future will accept these
or other enlargements of the public use concept. But even under present
standards it is clear that the Constitution permits a wide range of statutory
authority for joint projects. A key element in the past success of innovative
legislative programs in meeting constitutional tests has been proper docu-
mentation of the broad public interests behind the programs. To be suc-
cessful in court legislation must clearly state its public goals in light of prior
26. In the Scandinavian and Germanic countries, large public holdings have
been traditional, many of them dating from feudal times. Finland granted
tracts of land for the founding of towns with a restriction against alienating
full title, with the result that Finnish towns still own virtually all land within
their boundaries. In 1926, they had sold for building sites only 3 per
cent of their aggregate corporate area. In Sweden, Stockholm has acquired,
since 1904, some 20,000 acres of land, or five times the original area of the
city. The next five largest Swedish cities own from 47 to 80 percent of their
municipal areas. In Germany, Berlin owns 75,000 acres within its city limits,
or one-third of its area, and another 75,000 acres outside. Taken as a group,
the German cities of over 50,000 population own 23.6 per cent of their area
(excluding land in streets, railways, and other utilities) largely devoted to
agricultural and forest use.
J. BEUSCHER, LAND USE CONTROLS-CASES AND MATERIALS 515 (3d ed. 1964).
27. See Rindge Co. v. Los Angeles, 262 U.S. 700 (1923); United States v. Agee,
322 F.2d 139 (6th Cir. 1963); Chicago v. Barnes, 30 Ill. 2d 255, 195 N.E.2d 629
(1964); Lerch v. Maryland Port Authority, 240 Md. 438, 214 A.2d 761 (1965).
28. Cincinnati v. Vester, 33 F.2d 242 (6th Cir. 1929), a~fd, 281 U.S. 439 (1930);
Puerto Rico v. Eastern Sugar Associates, 156 F.2d 316 (1st Cir. 1946); Adams v.
Housing Authority, 60 So. 2d 663 (Fla. Sup. Ct. 1952); Opinion of the Justices, 204
Mass. 607, 91 N.E. 405 (1910). See also Board of Educ. v. Baczewski, 340 Mich. 265,
65 N.W.2d 810 (1954). But see Waukegan v. Stanczak, 6 Ill. 2d 594, 129 N.E.2d 751
(1955).
29. See cases cited note 22 supra.
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judicial determinations of the meaning of public use.3 0
Necessity and Extent of Taking
The public use test described above determines only whether government
can lawfully undertake a particular project. A second constitutional ques-
tion, commonly referred to as the issue of "necessity," concerns the amount
of land the government can condemn to carry out a lawful project. The
courts have held that a condemning agency has broad discretion to decide
this question of necessity subject to whatever limits are set forth in the
relevant enabling legislation.3 1 The power to decide the extent of property
to be acquired may be delegated to public administrative agencies or to
private individuals regulated by such agencies and subject to agency review.
Statutes provide guides to the goals and methods to be employed and the
courts give these agencies great flexibility in the exercise of delegated power
to determine when and where to construct public projects.3 2  Even greater
discretion is allowed regarding how much land and money to devote to any
project.33
30. In some cases an element of "legal fiction" may be involved. For example,
public low-income and middle-income housing programs have been upheld as an indi-
rect method for alleviating slum conditions. See, e.g., Cremer v. Peoria Housing
Authority, 399 Ill. 579, 78 N.E.2d 276 (1948); Allydonn Realty Corp. v. Holyoke
Housing Authority, 304 Mass. 288, 23 N.E.2d 665 (1939); Ferch v. Housing Au-
thority, 79 N.D. 764, 59 N.W.2d 849 (1953); cf. Blakemore v. Cincinnati Metro-
politan Housing Authority, 144 Ohio St. 178, 57 N.E.2d 397 (1944).
31. On those occasions when an agency determination of necessity has been over-
turned as a clear abuse of discretion, the basis for the holding is usually to be found
in the enabling law rather than in rules of constitutional standing. Compare Ottawa
v. Carey, 108 U.S. 110 (1883), with Cincinnati v. Vester, 33 F.2d 242 (6th Cir. 1929),
a/I'd, 281 U.S. 439 (1930). But see Shizas v. Detroit, 333 Mich. 44, 52 N.W.2d 589
(1952); In re Real Property in Hewlett Bay Park, 48 Misc. 2d 833, 265 N.Y.S.2d 1006
(1966), holding that takings were excessive where the alleged abuses of discretion
were less than clear.
32. See Johnson City v. Cloninger, 213 Tenn. 71, 372 S.W.2d 281 (1963); King v.
Flood Control Dist., 210 S.W.2d 438 (1948). See also Dalche v. Board of Comm'r,
49 F.2d 374 (E.D. La. 1931). The requisite proof to avoid this rule is essentially
public fraud or collusion. See Reel v. Freeport, 61 111. App. 2d 448, 209 N.E.2d 675
(1965).
33. Compare Curran v. Guilfoyle, 38 App. Div. 82, 55 N.Y. Supp. 1018 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. App. Div. 1899), with In re Real Property in Hewlett Bay Park, 48 Misc. 2d 833,
265 N.Y.S. 2d 1006 (App. Div. 1966). Some states have attempted to broaden the dis-
cretion of government by statute and state constitutional amendment; however, the
results of these attempts are not clear. The California Constitution provides that if a
project passes the "public use" test because the purposes of the project as a totality jus-
tify condemnation, then the determination of the agency as to how much property to
condemn and what estate (fee, easement, etc.) are conclusive in court. For the varying
interpretations and scope of review under this formulation see People v. Lagiss, 160 Cal.
App. 2d 28, 324 P.2d 926 (1958). An informal conclusion from these cases is that
regardless of statutory or other authority, an agency is best advised to develop a rational
plan for choosing the extent of condemnation. For example, see the very broad plan
[Vol. 20:93
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The following are examples of types of condemnation which have been
upheld as constitutional under proper enabling legislation. They are arrayed
in a range from the obviously necessary takings to those more remotely re-
lated to the principal project.
1. Land actually within the physical boundaries of the planned
improvement.
2. Land for auxiliary support facilities such as gasoline stations
and restaurants located on major highways.3 4
3. Temporary work space easement for such purposes as equip-
ment storage.35
4. Protection apron such as that necessary to provide access space
adjacent to a reservoir or to stop pollution of a reservoir by occu-
pants of adjacent property.3 6
5. Scenic easement or light and air rights typically to provide
better recreational opportunities or to preserve the beauty of a
public project.3 7




7. Land taken in fee for temporary use such as dump, fill, gravel or
stone quarry sites.
3 9
8. Commercial development areas assembled adjacent to port fa-
cilities, for lease or sale to public or private interests. 40
9. Relocation or replacement land leased or sold to people or
businesses displaced by a project. 41
10. Future protection exemplified by taking of a man made pen-
insula or island in a reservoir project to forestall nuisance problems
from private development of the property. 42
11. Reduction of project cost by acquiring small remainder rem-
nants.
43
adopted by the New York Power Authority for the St. Lawrence Seaway. Cuglar v.
Power Authority, 4 Wisc. 2d 879, 163 N.Y.S.2d 902 (App. Div. 1957).
34. Opinion of the Justices, 330 Mass. 713, 113 N.E.2d 452 (1953).
35. Boston v. Talbot, 206 Mass. 82, 91 N.E. 1014 (1910).
36. Pearl River Water Dist. v. Wood, 248 Miss. 748, 160 So. 2d 917 (1964).
37. Kamrowski v. Wisconsin, 31 Wis. 2d 256, 142 N.W.2d 793 (1966).
38. Cleveland v. Detroit, 322 Mich. 172, 33 N.W.2d 747 (1948).
39. Boston v. Talbot, 206 Mass. 82, 91 N.E. 1014 (1910).
40. Atwood v. Willacy County Navigation Dist., 153 Tex. 645, 271 S.W.2d 137,
appeal dismissed, 350 U.S. 804 (1954).
41. Culley v. Industrial Comm'n, 234 Miss. 788, 108 So. 2d 390 (1959).
42. Cuglar v. Power Authority, 4 Misc. 2d 879, 163 N.Y.S.2d 902 (1957), at'd,
4 App. Div. 2d 801, 164 N.Y.S.2d 686 (1957), alfd, 3 N.Y.2d 1006, 170 N.Y.S.2d
341, 147 N.E.2d 733 (1957) (per curiam).
43. Baltimore v. Clunet, 23 Md. 449 (1865). Extension of this concept to permit
condemnation of land benefitted by a project in order to sell the land at a profit and
defray some project costs (the recoupment theory) has been disapproved by some courts
as an abuse of the power of eminent domain. Cincinnati v. Vester, 33 F.2d 242
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Statutory Authority and Limitations
The Constitution does not in itself grant any powers to engage in public
projects. Each project must be authorized by statute. This section will
examine statutes vesting in state agencies and local governmental units the
power to engage in public projects. Certain federal assistance programs
which contain substantive standards will also be reviewed. Considered first
is the range of joint development potentials that are available to highway
departments acting alone.44 Examined next are the potentials available
when highway departments and urban renewal join forces. Finally, the pos-
sibility of joint development projects participated in by other government
agencies is considered.
Powers of the Highway Department
In the evolution of highway departments' powers to acquire and develop
land the underlying issue has remained constant over the years. This
problem involves the reconciliation of the rights of private property with
society's needs for public transportation facilities. It has been raised in
different contexts such as the proper width of the right-of-way, the control
of highway access and the use of highway lands for restaurants and other
service facilities. Resolution on a case basis has paralleled the expansion
of the constitutional standards of public use discussed in the previous section.
Land Necessary for the Highway
Typical highway enabling legislation authorizes departments to acquire
lands necessary for the construction, operation, and maintenance of state
highways. 45 Under such broad and general grants of power the courts have
(6th Cir. 1929), aff'd, 281 U.S. 439 (1930). However, building facilities large enough
to accommodate future growth and leasing or selling excess property for profit has
been approved by one court. Lerch v. Maryland Port Authority, 240 Md. 438, 214
A.2d 761 (1965).
44. The term "highway department" is used although in many states the appropri-
ate agency's name differs. The agency responsible for highways is often known as
the Department of Public Works (Massachusetts, Illinois) or, more recently, the De-
partment of Transportation (New York). There are also specialized agencies with
authority over particular highways such as state toll road commissions and the Tribor-
ough Bridge & Tunnel Authority (New York).
45. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 121, § 4-501 (Supp. 1970); IND. ANN. STAT. § 36-118 (Supp.
1969). Although the land for the interstate highway system is normally acquired
through state processes, the Federal-Aid Highway Act, 23 U.S.C. § 101 (1964) provides
in Section 107(a), (the so-called federal "quick take" provision) that the federal govern-
ment, when requested by a state, may acquire lands necessary for rights-of-way in
connection with the interstate system. This power may only be invoked if the
Secretary of Transporation determines that the state is unable to acquire the necessary
lands or is unable to acquire them with sufficient promptness. In this connection see
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traditionally upheld the departments' right to fix the width of highways in-
cluding the median strips and shoulders, 46 and in two cases the taking of land
for access control. 47  It is clear that the departments' discretion to choose
the location of the highway will not come under judicial scrutiny unless
there has been a clear abuse of discretion. 48
Highway-Related Facilities
In addition to obtaining land necessary for the highway, state highway de-
partments have often sought to acquire land for facilities related to the
highway. On occasion the courts have upheld such authority under general
statutory grants of power. For example, in one case the court approved the
taking of land for a vehicle weighing station although the statutes contained
no specific mention of such facilities. 49 More commonly, however, highway
departments have found it desirable to obtain special statutory authority for
the development of specific highway-related facilities.5 ° Thus various states
have enacted statutes permitting the acquisition of land for the construction
of such related facilities as gasoline stations, administrative offices, and
restaurants5 1 although federal law now prohibits the construction of service
United States v. Certain Parcels of Land, 209 F. Supp. 483 (S.D. Ill. 1962), aff'd, 314
F.2d 825 (7th Cir. 1963).
46. See, e.g., Rand v. Mississippi State Highway Comm'n, 191 Miss. 230, 199
So. 374 (1941); State ex rel. State Highway Comm'n v. Curtis, 359 Mo. 402, 222
S.W.2d 64 (1949); Pennslyvania Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Philadelphia, 242 Pa. 47,
88 A. 904 (1913) (dictum); State Road Comm'n v. Bouchelle, 137 W. Va. 572, 73
S.E.2d 432 (1952).
47. State ex rel. State Highway Comm'n v. James, 356 Mo. 1161, 205 S.W.2d 534
(1947). "While it is true that a number of states have passed acts for the public con-
trol of highway access, it may be noted that in many of such states the highway
commissioner did not possess the broad statutory power granted the highway commis-
sioner under the Minnesota Act .. " Burquist v. Cook, 220 Minn. 48, 57, 19
N.W.2d 394, 405 (1945).
48. See, e.g., Department of Public Works v. Farina, 29 Ill. 2d 474, 194 N.E.2d 209
(1963); Minnesota v. Ohman, 263 Minn. 115, 116 N.W.2d 101 (1962); Lehmann
v. Waukesha County Highway Comm'n, 15 Wis. 2d 94, 112 N.W.2d 127 (1961).
Usually the highway department must follow certain statutory procedures such as hold-
ing public hearing prior to locating the route. See 23 U.S.C. § 128 (1964). The
hearing requirement does not, however, detract from the department's ultimate right
to choose the highway location. Hinrichs v. Iowa State Highway Comm'n, 260 Iowa
1115, 152 N.W.2d 248 (1967); cf. Nashville 1-40 Steering Comm. v. Ellington, 387
F.2d 179 (6th Cir. 1967).
49. Woolley v. State Highway Comm'n, 387 P.2d 667 (Wyo. 1963). Contra Web-
ster v. Frawley, 262 Wis. 392, 55 N.W.2d 523 (1952).
50. "Legislation may be desirable to deal in advance with certain other procedural
and administrative problems bound to arise in the establishment and operation of a
modem highway system." R. NETHERTON, CONTROL OF HIGHWAY ACCESS 87 (1963).
51. Such statutes are discussed in Illinois State Toll Highway Comm'n v. Eden
Cemetery Ass'n, 16 Ill. 2d 539, 158 N.E.2d 766 (1959); Opinion of the Justices, 330
Mass. 713, 113 N.E.2d 452 (1953); Bloomfield v. New Jersey Highway Authority, 18
N.J. 237, 113 A.2d 658 (1955).
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stations and other commercial facilities on rights-of-way of the interstate
system. 12
Land Alongside the Highway
Highway departments have long recognized that the construction of high-
ways frequently adds to the value of adjoining land. If the highway de-
partment could acquire this land and sell it at a higher price after the high-
way was built it could recoup part of the cost of building the highway. An
early Massachusetts case held that such action would be unconstitutional
under a state constitution;5 3 however, the constitution was later amended to
permit the taking of land for "suitable building lots" on both sides of a high-
way. 54 Similar provisions are now found in a number of other state constitu-
tions.55 Other states have passed statutes specifically permitting "remnant
condemnation," such as the taking of entire lots even though only part of the
lot will be needed for the highway.5 6 The Department of Transportation has
in at least one instance approved the use of federal funds for the acquisition
of remnants which were to be devoted to highway beautification purposes. 7
Air Rights Over the Highway
In some states the highway department acquires only an easement for high-
52. 23 U.S.C. § 111 (1964). The states have enacted similar provisions to conform
to the federal requirement. See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 121, § 9-113.1 (Supp. 1970).
This section does not apply to the Illinois tollway system. An exception is also made
for telephone service. Id. § 8-107.1. The federal statute does permit the use of air
space above and below the highway for these facilities.
53. Opinion of the Justices, 204 Mass. 607, 91 N.E. 405 (1910). See also Rindge
Co. v. Los Angeles, 262 U.S. 700 (1923); Cincinnati v. Vester, 33 F.2d 242 (6th Cir.
1929).
54. MAss. CONST., Part 1, art. X.
55. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 142; OHIO CONST. art. XVIII, § 10; PA. CONST. art. X,
§ 4.
56. "Whenever a part of a parcel of land is to be taken for state highway purposes
and the remainder is to be left in such shape or condition as to be of little value
to its owner, or to give rise to claims or litigation concerning severance or other dam-
age, the department may acquire the whole parcel and may sell the remainder or may
exchange the same for other property needed for state highway purposes." CAL.
STS. & H'WAYS CODE § 104.1 (West 1969). See also ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 121, § 4-501
(Supp. 1970). For a survey of state laws relating to excess highway acquisition powers,
see HOUSE COMM. ON PUBLIC WORKS, 90TH CONG., 1ST SESS., DEP'T OF TRANS-
PORTATION STUDY, ADVANCE ACQUISIrION OF HIGHWAY RIGHTS-OF-WAY, Table 1 at 6, 7
(Comm. Print 1967).
57. The Highway Beautification Act of 1965, 23 U.S.C. § 319(b) (Supp. V, 1970),
provides that funds are to be allocated to the states, without being matched by the
states, for use for landscape and roadside development within federal-aid highway
rights-of-way and for acquisition and improvement of strips necessary to restore and
enhance scenic beauty adjacent to highways, including acquisition and development of
rest and recreation areas.
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way use. 58 In many states, however, highway departments acquire the fee
title to all lands on which the highway is located which includes the air
rights over the highway.59 State statutes generally permit the highway de-
partment to sell or lease any land no longer needed for highway purposes. 60
It is unclear whether the sale or lease of air rights is authorized by such stat-
utes, 61 although a number of states have passed specific statutes authorizing
the lease of air rights over highways for either private or public develop-
ment.6
2
If state statutory authority exists, federal permission for air rights proj-
ects over interstate highways may be granted under the Federal-Aid High-
way Act of 1961 .6 3 However, federal funds cannot be used for any addi-
tional costs of construction required by the air rights development such as
structural columns, ventilation, and lighting unless such costs are offset by a
reduction in right-of-way costs. The proposed air rights project must not re-
sult in any interference with highway access or maintenance and the user of
air space must provide the necessary protection for the public and the
highway. Any income received from the air rights facilities will be the re-
sponsibility and property of the state. 64
58. It is generally held that the highway department obtains an easement unless a
statute specifically authorizes acquisition of the fee. See 26 AM. JUR. 2d Eminent
Domain § 136 (1966).
59. See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 121, § 4-501 (Supp. 1970).
60. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 81, § 7E (1958); CAL. STS. & HWAYS
CODE § 118 (West 1969); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 121, § 4-508 (Supp. 1970).
61. Section 118 of the CALIFORNIA STREETS AND HIGHWAYS CODE, permitting the sale
or exchange of lands no longer necessary, for highway use, has been interpreted to
authorize the sale of air space since it is "an interest in land." California has,
however, also specifically authorized the lease of air rights in Section 104.12.
62. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 81, § 7L (1969) (lease only, up to ninety-
nine years); CAL. STS. & H'WAYS CODE § 104.12 (West 1969) (lease ,without limitation
in time). A bill pending in Congress would permit the District of Columbia to lease air
space above and below limited access divided highways within the District.
63. 23 U.S.C. § 111 (1964). The regulations which apply to all federal-aid high-
ways provide "subject to 23 U.S.C. § 111, the temporary or permanent occupancy or
use of right-of-way, including air space, for nonhighway purposes . . . may be ap-
proved by the Administrator [Secretary], if he determines that such occupancy, use or
reservation is in the public interest and will not impair the highway or interfere with
the free and safe flow of traffic thereon." 23 C.F.R. § 1.23(c) (1960). Although
subject to 23 U.S.C. § 111 (1964), which only applies to the interstate system,
the regulation refers to the "temporary or permanent" use of air space. There is no
conflict with Regulation 1.23(c), and it therefore may be assumed that both the sale
and lease of air rights is contemplated by § 111. See also 23 C.F.R. § 1,23(b) (1960),
which provides that "the State highway departments shall be responsible for pre-
serving such right-of-way free of all public and private installations, facilities or en-
croachments, except (1) those approved under paragraph (c) of this section; (2) those
which the Administrator [Secretary] approves as constituting a part of a highway or
as necessary for its operation, use or maintenance for public highway purposes. .... "
id.
64. Bureau of Public Roads Policy and Procedure Memorandum 80-5, Attachment
3 (1967).
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The extent to which federal financing may be used for air rights develop-
ment depends on the nature of the development. For example, the federal
government will not ordinarily pay for the cost of providing the foundation or
deck upon which air rights facilities can be constructed; 65 but there are im-
portant exceptions. A memorandum prepared in connection with the dis-
pute over the Delaware Expressway in Philadelphia 66 states that where a
tunnel or cut-and-cover section is "necessary for," or "integral to," the
highway the cost for the deck or tunnel will be considered part of the high-
way. Where tunnels or cut-cover sections are unnecessary or "additional"
no part of the cost can come from federal highw ay funds.0 7
Highway beautification funds may also be available for air rights de-
velopment. The Delaware Expressway Task Force Report recommends
use of such funds for a landscape cover over urban highway rights-of-way.6 s
The Report construes the statutory"9 term "adjacent to" as encompassing
air space immediately above a highway. 70 The advent of unique proposals
relating to air rights development over portions of the interstate highway
system will undoubtedly stir more controversy with respect to payment of
costs necessary for the construction of decks or other cover facilities.
65. Id.
66. Report of the Interdepartmental Task Force on the Delaware Expressway in
Philadelphia, Pa., App. 1-29 (1967).
67. It is important to note that Section 111 of Title 23 applies to neither
true tunnels nor cut-and-cover sections necessitated by local situations in the
construction of Interstate Highway systems. These methods of construction-
as in urban sections of Interstate Highways in Boston, Washington, New
York and elsewhere-are sometimes necessary in densely developed urban
areas when valuable commercial, industrial, governmental or historic structures
and areas would be seriously damaged by a surface-level or uncovered high-
way.
In the central Philadelphia situation, it is a complex question of judgment(what in courts is called a 'mixed' question of fact and law) which of the
proposed uses of air space over Interstate 95 are integral parts of highway's
construction, necessary to minimize adverse affects upon the environment-
and where are additional measures permitted by Section 111, but whose costs
should not be borne by Interstate Highway funds.
If it is determined that the covering of some portion of the Interstate Sec-
tion B open-trench highway is an integral part of the highway's construction at
this historic, central city, and riverside location-then thorough considera-
tion should be given to making the provisions of Section 111 available to the
State or the city for the construction at their expense of buildings in air space
over other adjacent portions of the expressway, which the highway program
is not obligated to cover.
Id. at App. 9.
68. Id. at App. 11-6.
69. 23 U.S.C. § 319(b) (Supp. V, 1970) provides that funds may be used for
"enhancement of scenic beauty adjacent to" federal-aid highways.
70. The Report also discusses the possibility of developing lands adjacent to the
highway and the historic Penn's Landing as a "roadside safety rest and recreation
area." Interdepartmental Report, supra note 66, at App. 11-6.
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Space Under Elevated Highways
Many of the same legal considerations that affect the use of air rights over
a highway are applicable to the sale or lease of land under an elevated
highway for uses not directly related to highways. The federal statute per-
mitting the use of interstate highway air rights applies equally to space
above and below the roadway. 71 Similarly, some state statutes authorizing
the sale or lease of air rights also apply to space below a highway 72 or the
disposition of this space might be accomplished under the power to sell or
lease land no longer needed for highway purposes.
Land Amid Highways
Modem expressways typically consist of parallel lanes of highway separated
by a median strip. In the urban setting the relative narrowness of median
land limits its development potential although rapid transit systems are now
using median lands in some states.71 Land acquisition costs for median
strips used for non-highway purposes cannot be paid out of federal highway
funds. However, the Secretary of Transportation may authorize the use of
land within the highway right-of-way for non-highway purposes if he deter-
mines that such occupancy is "in the public interest and will not impair the
highway or interfere with the free and safe flow of traffic thereon. ' 74 In
the case of the existing rapid transit line in Chicago's Eisenhower Express-
way federal highway authorities granted permission for the median strip
development. This was facilitated by the fact that an existing transit right-
of-way was taken for the expressway and the median strip location was
given in exchange. The subsequent development of median strips for rapid
transit on the Kennedy and Dan Ryan Expressways required the City of
Chicago to purchase additional rights-of-way without the use of federal
highway funds.75
In addition to the typical median strip found between lanes of modem
highways, large interchanges typically enclose vacant land not used for high-
way purposes. Many proposals have been made for the use of this land for
various types of facilities. 76 Unused lands might be sold or leased to other
71. 23 U.S.C. § 111 (Supp. V, 1970).
72. See, e.g., CAL. STS. & H'WAYS CODE § 104.12 (West 1969).
73. The Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1964, 49 U.S.C. § 1602 (Supp. V,
1970) has provided funds for federal assistance in the use of highway median strips
for mass transit facilities.
74. 23 C.F.R. § 1.23(c) (1970).
75. "The U.S. Bureau of Public Roads reduced its matching grant from 90 per-
cent to 85 percent to account for the cost of the transit median." Campbell, Transpor-
tation System Corridors, 166 HIGHWAY RESEARCH REcORD 26, 31 (1967).
76. Id. at 107, 109.
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public agencies or private developers under provisions authorizing the sale
or lease of lands no longer necessary; however, this might raise questions
regarding the reason for acquiring the land in the first place. Specific statu-
tory authority would probably be more desirable. The federal regulation
prohibiting the use of lands within the right-of-way for non-highway pur-
poses 77 presents a formidable obstacle to many types of median strip or inter-
change developments. Since this statute permits air rights development,
however, it may be possible to combine the sale or lease of the air rights
with development of land amid the highway and thereby provide the neces-
sary access. This interesting issue will undoubtedly be resolved as imagina-
tive proposals for development of land-locked parcels are presented to state
and federal highway officials. 78
Urban Renewal and Joint Development
The powers of highway departments acting alone to engage in joint de-
velopment projects vary considerably from state to state and depend pri-
marily on the type of facilities to be constructed and their relationship to the
highway. The potential for joint development projects can be substan-
tially enlarged, however, by the participation of other agencies in addition
to the state highway departments. This section will consider the joint de-
velopment potentials available when urban renewal enters the picture. The
relevant powers of urban renewal agencies can be divided into two cate-
gories for purposes of this analysis: (a) the redevelopment of blighted and
deteriorating areas, and (b) the construction of housing outside such areas.
Projects in Blighted or Deteriorating Areas
The acquisition and clearance of land ultimately to be used for highways
can be conducted by local urban renewal agencies only when the highway
will pass through lands qualifying for redevelopment under state laws. 79
The urban renewal agency acquires the land which will be devoted to the
highway as a part of its overall acquisition of property in a renewal area.
After the agency clears the land it is conveyed to the highway department.
There are several legal advantages to be gained by cooperation between high-
way departments and urban renewal agencies on this type of project. First,
it may reduce the number of condemnation suits. Second, it can relieve the
highway department of the often sticky problem of whether to acquire
77. 23 C.F.R. § 1.23(b) (1970). For exceptions see note 63 supra.
78. Development of land adjacent to the interchange but not within the ramps
themselves is a separate question. The analysis of land alongside highways in this
section also applies to these adjacent lands.
79. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 139-62-1 (1963); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §
99.010 (1968); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160-454 (Supp. 1969).
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remnant land. Third, it may enable the entire demolition and clearance to
be handled by a single agency.
In Pittsburgh80 and St. Louis8l federally-aided urban renewal-highway
projects are either under construction or have been completed. The me-
chanics of funding these and similar projects have been worked out by the
Department of Housing and Urban Development and the Department of
Transportation and the particular state highway department and local urban
renewal agency.8 2
Federal urban renewal laws provide financial assistance for the following
projects: land acquisition,8 3 clearance,8 4 installation of streets, parks, and
other improvements,8 5 and the acquisition of other properties in urban re-
newal areas "necessary to eliminate unhealthy . . . conditions . . . or other-
wise to remove or prevent the spread of blight or deterioration or to provide
land for needed public facilities."8 6 Land may be acquired if it is in a slum
or deteriorating area or is vacant land which substantially impairs the
growth of the community.8 7 The federal government requires that rede-
velopment of urban renewal lands by public agencies, including highway
departments, and by private redevelopers must be consistent with an urban
renewal plan approved by the local public agency and federal authorities.8 8
Experience has shown89 an urban renewal plan can include highways as a
redevelopment land-use consistent with the requirement that urban renewal
lands be used for community improvement and the elimination of slums and
blight.
80. The Chateau Street West Project.
81. The Mill Creek Project.
82. Similar procedures apply to other land uses co-ordinated with urban renewal,
e.g., mass transportation, parks and schools. See text accompanying notes 98-109 infra.
Typical of state legislation authorizing the conveyance of urban renewal lands to
other agencies is ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 67 2, § 91.115 (1967) which states in part that:
When the Department, as agent for the municipality, has acquired title to, and
possession of any or all real property in the area of a redevelopment project,
the Department (I) may convey to any public body having jurisdiction over
schools, parks or playgrounds in the area in which the project is situated such
parts of such real property for use for parks, playgrounds, schools and other
public purposes as the Department may determine, and at such price or prices
as the Department and the proper officials of such public bodies may agree
upon....
Id.
83. 42 U.S.C. § 1460(c)(1) (Supp. V, 1970).
84. Id. § 1460(c)(2).
85. Id. § 1460(c)(3).
86. Id. § 1460(c)(6).
87. Id. §H 1460(c)(1)(i)-(ii).
88. The local authority's approval must include findings, inter alia, that the plan
conforms to plans for development of the locality as a whole and gives consideration
to park and recreation facilities. Id. § 1455(a)(iii)-(iv) (Supp. V, 1970). Approval
of the plan by federal authorities is required under § 1451(c), (e).
89. See, e.g., Mill Creek Project.
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The joint development possibilities accruing from this federal assistance
base are available only where the state has enacted urban renewal legisla-
tion providing local public agencies (LPA's) with the authority to engage
in those activities for which federal funds are available. Forty-nine states
have one or more statutes9" granting LPA's the power to engage in urban
redevelopment including the specific statutory authority to cooperate with
other public agencies.91 The powers delegated by the states are generally
consistent with federal law although there is considerable variation between
states.
The Department of Transportation's procedures facilitate state highway
departments' cooperation with local urban renewal agencies. Where the
LPA does not receive federal funds for land acquisition the Department of
Transportation simply recognizes the LPA as an agent of the state.92 Where
the LPA receives urban renewal assistance from the Department of Housing
and Urban Development, the Department of Transportation's formula cover-
ing its participation depends on the factual situation leading to the agree-
ment between the state highway department and the LPA. Where the
LPA acquires the land prior to any agreement with the highway department
and subsequently transfers the land to the highway department there are
two methods of reimbursement. If the land is cleared by the LPA prior
to the conveyance to the highway department the Department of Transpor-
tation's participation will be limited to the fair market value of the cleared
land without regard to the acquisition or clearance costs paid by the LPA.
If improvements have not been removed prior to the conveyance agree-
ment the Department of Transportation's participation will be the fair market
value as determined by the LPA's costs, which may include land clearance.
In those instances where the state highway department and the LPA enter
into an agreement prior to the acquisition of lands, reimbursement will be
based on the fair market value paid by the LPA plus the cost of improve-
ments and their removal if the agreement so provides. 93
Housing on New Land
The primary purpose of the urban renewal program is to improve the con-
90. See HOUSING AND HOME FINANCE AGENCY, STATE ENABLING LEGISLATIONS URBAN
REDEVELOPMENT AND URBAN RENEWAL (1962).
91. See, e.g., IOWA CODE § 403.1 (1966); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-4754 (1964);
NEV. REV. STAT. § 279.340 (1968).
92. Bureau of Public Roads Policy and Procedure Memorandum 80-1, 4(d).
93. Id. For a detailed explanation of the mechanics see J. Cunliffe, Joint Highway
-Urban Redevelopment Projects, UNIV. OF WISCONSIN SixTH ANNUAL HIGHWAY LAW
WORKSHOP (1967).
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dition of blighted and deteriorating areas. An ancillary objective, however,
is the construction of housing on new land to meet the needs of persons dis-
placed by clearance projects. Although the federal law ordinarily limits
the construction of urban renewal housing to blighted or deteriorating
areas,94 there are two important exceptions. Federally-assisted urban re-
newal housing for families and individuals of low and moderate income may
be built on either: (1) vacant land necessary for community growth which
will be devoted to residential uses, or (2) air rights in areas where high-
ways, tunnels, or railway tracks have a blighting influence on the surround-
ing area. 95
The Housing Act of 1964 added authorization for federal participation in
the "construction of foundations and platforms necessary for the provision
on air rights sites of housing (and related facilities and uses) designed spe-
cifically for, and limited to, families and individuals of low or moderate in-
come. ... 96 The use of air rights sites for housing developments may re-
ceive federal aid so long as it is consistent with the requirement that it be de-
voted to low and moderate income housing and that it aid in the removal of
the blighting influence of the highway.97
Other Government Agencies
Urban renewal and highway cooperation involving both land acquisition
and air rights development is but one example of federal assistance programs
which may be utilized for the joint development of transportation facilities
and other public and private programs. A sampling of the opportunities
provided by other federal programs follows.
Mass Transit
The Urban Mass Transportation Act of 196498 provides federal assistance for
the acquisition and construction of facilities and equipment for mass trans-
portation service in urban areas. The statute provides that federal assist-
ance will be used "in coordinating such service with highway and other
94. The so-called "blighted vacant" areas (i.e., areas where title problems inhibit
development) are included in this definition.
95. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1460(c)(1)(iii)-(iv) (Supp. V, 1970).
96. Id. § 1460(c)(7). Deck or platform costs may thus be included in urban re-
newal projects in all project areas. This section also permits the construction of
platforms and foundations necessary for the provision of air rights sites for idustrial
development.
97. For a detailed explanation of the requirements for air rights projects financed
by urban renewal funds see Housing and Home Finance Agency, Local Public Agency
Letter No. 324 (1965).
98. 49 U.S.C. § 1601 (Supp. V, 1970).
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transportation in such areas. Eligible facilities and equipment may include
land (but not public highways), buses and other rolling stock, and other
real or personal property needed for an efficient and coordinated mass trans-
portation system."'' 9 Federal grants for approved mass transit projects
shall not exceed two-thirds of the portion of the cost of a project which cannot
be reasonably financed from revenues. 100
Joint development and coordinated planning are required by statute.
Except as specified in Section 1604 of this title [relating to
emergency programs], no Federal financial assistance shall be pro-
vided pursuant to Section 1602 of this title unless the Secretary
determines that the facilities and equipment for which the assist-
ance is sought are needed for carrying out a program, meeting
criteria established by him, for a unified or officially coordinated
urban transportation system as a part of the comprehensively
planned development of the urban area, and are necessary for the
sound, economic, and desirable development of such an area. 1 1
In order to assure coordination of highway and railway and
other mass transportation planning and development programs in
urban areas, particularly with respect to the provision of mass
transportation facilities in connection with federally assisted high-
ways, the Secretary and the Secretary of Commerce shall consult on
general urban transportation policies and programs and shall ex-
change information on proposed projects in urban areas.' 0 2
Knowing that federal funds are available, states may wish to expedite acquisi-
tion of transit right-of-way by granting the highway authority specific powers
to acquire land for rapid transit median-strip service. Virginia, for example,
has vested its highway department with the power to acquire the additional
land if by prior agreement the local transit agency has agreed to pay the cost
of it.103 As in the case of urban renewal-highway cooperation, for obvious
99. Id. § 1602(a).
100. Id. § 1603(a).
101. Id. The Highway Act contains a complementary provision, 23 U.S.C. § 134
(1964), which provides in part that:
It is declared to be in the national interest to encourage and promote the de-
velopment of transportation systems, embracing various modes of transport in
a manner that will serve the States and local communities efficiently and ef-
fectively .... After July 1, 1965, the Secretary shall not approve . . . any
program for projects in any urban area of more than fifty thousand popula-
tion unless he finds that such projects are based on a continuing compre-
hensive transportation planning process carried on cooperatively by States
and local communities in conformance with the objectives stated in this section.
Id. § 134.
102. 49 U.S.C. § 1607 (1964). The Secretary of Commerce's responsibilities under
this statute have been transferred to the Secretary of Transportation. Id. § 1655(a)
(2)(B).
103. VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1357 (Supp. 1966).
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practical reasons the agency acquiring the greatest amount of land-in this
case the highway department-usually acquires the land needed by the
mass transit agency requiring less land.10 4
Open Space and Urban Beautification
In most states eminent domain powers have been granted to local parks and
recreation departments. In urban areas this may now be combined with
federal financial assistance under the Open Space Land and Urban Beauti-
fication program. 10 5 As amended by the Housing and Urban Development
Act of 1965, the program provides for federal grants up to 50 percent of the
total cost to help finance the acquisition, clearance, and development of lands
in urban areas for open space uses. 106 Open space uses means any use of
open-space land for (1) park and recreational purposes, (2) conservation of
land and other natural resources, or (3) historic or scenic purposes.'0 7
Acquisition of lands for open space and recreational purposes may be
accomplished by the local parks or recreation departments acting in con-
junction with highway departments or other agencies. l08 In addition, parks
departments may also acquire lands from other agencies such as urban re-
newal or the highway department. Federal open space funds may be used
to assist in the purchase of these lands from other agencies. 10 9
Other State and Local Agencies
Land acquisition powers have traditionally been granted to agencies re-
sponsible for the development of schools, public housing and transportation.
State law also establishes many special purpose agencies such as toll road
commissions, port authorities and industrial development commissions. In
each case, the legislative act creating the agency must be examined to de-
termine the extent of the authority of the agency to acquire and develop
104. There is, however, no legal obstacle to the reverse. For example, the highway
department may sell or lease air rights to local urban renewal agencies for the con-
struction of decks or platforms necessary for the development of housing or industry.
105. 42 U.S.C. § 1500 (1964).
106. Id. §§ 1500a-1500c (Supp. V, 1970). A limited amount of funds is also avail-
able for 90 percent demonstration grants. Id. § 1500c.
107. Id. § 1500e(4).
108. As we have seen, the highway departments themselves may develop strips of
land within the right-of-way and immediately adjacent thereto for open space
uses. The amount of land which may be acquired varies from state to state.
109. Open Space Grants to help finance land acquisition are limited to acquisitions
of "title to, or other permanent interests" in lands. Id. §§ 1500a(a), 1500c-1. In
those states which allow highway departments to sell unnecessary lands, federal open
space assistance would therefore be available, but where the highway department is
limited to the lease of these lands the open space provisions appear to preclude par-
ticipation.
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land. For example, not all agencies have the power of eminent domain.
Many industrial development authorities may only purchase and sell lands.
The answers to such questions as whether it may sell or lease air rights over
lands which it has acquired and whether one agency can acquire lands for
another public agency depend on the particular provisions of the state statute.
Post-Acquisition Legal Problems
Once the necessary funds have been obtained and the land acquired for the
construction of the joint project the major legal problems have been over-
come. Nevertheless, the operation and maintenance of a joint project does
involve certain legal consideration that should be kept in mind at the time the
project is planned.
Power to Sell or Lease Lands
Throughout this article reference has been made to the statutory authority
given to various agencies to sell or lease land. Reference will need to be
made to the specific statutes to determine the conditions under which such
transactions can be made. For example, statutes providing for the sale to
private persons of lands no longer needed for highway purposes typically re-
quire that the lands be sold at public auction by sealed bids. 1 0 Urban
renewal statutes, however, frequently permit a negotiated sale."' Urban
renewal statutes also invariably authorize the public agency to attach condi-
tions and restrictions to the sale of land to private developers in order to con-
trol the development of the land in accordance with an overall plan-a power
other agencies may lack.112 In some cases the long-term lease of land may
prove a more effective method of maintaining control over the future develop-
ment by private lessees. 113 In general, where land is to be conveyed between
two public agencies these restrictions do not apply." 14
Power to Make Contracts
The successful operation and maintenance of some joint projects may re-
quire long-term contracts between various public agencies and/or private
developers. As a general rule public agencies are not authorized to enter
into contracts in the absence of specific statutory authority;" 5 but urban re-
110. See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 121, § 4-508 (Supp. 1970).
111. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-4750(b) (1964).
112. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 8-137 (1958).
113. See Brownfield & Rosen, Leasing in the Disposition of Urban Renewal Land,
26 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 1, 37 (1967).
114. See generally 10 MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS 141 (3d ed. 1966).
115. 81 C.J.S. States § 113 (1953).
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newal agencies have frequently been granted broad powers to enter into
contracts with other public agencies.' 16 To the extent that long-term con-
tracts are essential to a project it will be necessary to examine the powers
of the particular agency involved.
Liability Problems
Where different parts of a joint project are being operated by different public
or private agencies a question may arise regarding the liability of the various
agencies for injuries that might occur during the operation of the project or
for damage to the project as a result of fire or other casualty. For example,
in the case of the air rights project over the Trans-Manhattan Expressway at
least one personal injury claim has been filed against the Port Authority, the
City of New York and the private developer. This claim arose out of an
icy spot on the roadway and there is a dispute regarding the cause of the
icy condition. Which of the three agencies will ultimately bear the re-
sponsibility, if any, is a matter yet to be decided. 117 The impact of liability
problems can be softened by careful advance planning which anticipates
this type of situation.
116. See, e.g., NEv. REv. STAT. § 279.340 (1967).
117. The three parties are related to the Trans-Manhattan project in the following
way: The Port Authority granted certain "volumes" of air space above the highway
to the city which in turn sold the "volumes" to the private developer. The indenture
agreement between the Port Authority and the city contained provisions whereby the
city agreed to hold harmless and indemnify the Port Authority for certain claims. In
the subsequent agreement the private developer agreed to assume the city's obligations
to the Port Authority.
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Mr. Koltnow identifies three stages in the development of a
highway system. The first stage emphasizes road construction;
the second, efficiency and economy. The third stage looks to the
quality of life and emphasizes the environmental impact of high-
ways. The author submits that we are at present in transition be-
tween the second and third stages of highway transportation de-
velopment. The barriers to more satisfactory urban highway devel-
opment, he argues, are governmental and legal rather than technical.
Technical improvements in fuel content, noise control, land use,
route location, and traffic flow depend upon proper allocation and
execution of administrative responsibility. In this view of the
freeway's impact on the city, the most formidable obstacle to satis-
factory highway development is faulty decision making.
